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Introduction 
  
On December 6, Venezuela will hold legislative elections in which all 167 seats of the country’s 
National Assembly will be contested. Polls indicate that the governing party is significantly less 
popular than it was during the last legislative elections of 2010, and that the opposition coalition of 
parties, known as the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de Unidad Democrática, or MUD, in 
Spanish), could possibly win a majority of seats for the first time since the late president Hugo 
Chávez was first elected in 1998.  
 
Some commentators, politicians, and analysts have stated that the opposition is virtually certain to 
win a majority and would likely gain a “supermajority” of three-fifths or two-thirds of total seats.1 
They also suggest that, should the opposition not win a majority or a large majority, then the 
government will surely have been guilty of “election rigging.” 
 
In this paper, we simulate — based on the 2010 results — the 2015 election under various 
assumptions regarding the government’s share of the vote and the degree to which the opposition is 
fractured among different coalitions. This simulation allows us to see how disproportional 
representation of smaller states and a unified pro-government coalition may continue to favor pro-
government parties.  
 
 
2010 vs. 2015 
 
In the previous elections for Venezuela’s National Assembly in 2010, the pro-government United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, or PSUV) received 48 percent of the 
vote and won 96 seats. Including two affiliated indigenous seats, the government held 59 percent of 
165 total seats. Since 2010, population growth has led the National Electoral Council (Consejo 
Nacional Electoral, or CNE) to expand and reallocate seats in five districts based on projections of 
population change by Venezuela’s National Statistics Institute districts; however, no districts have 
been redrawn since 2010.  
 
                                                 
1  Under Venezuela's 1999 constitution, these supermajorities allow the National Assembly to exercise special powers beyond those 
that exist for a simple majority. For instance, a 3/5 supermajority allows National Assembly members to remove ministers and 
executive vice-presidents and a 2/3 supermajority allows members to remove Supreme Court justices and appoint members of 
the National Electoral Council.  
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It is important to understand that the difference between the percentage of the vote and the 
percentage of seats received by a party or coalition is not the result of “gerrymandering” or any 
other manipulation of districts, as is sometimes suggested in the media. Like the United States and 
many other countries, Venezuela has a system of representation that gives disproportional 
representation to states with smaller populations. In the U.S. this is done through allocating two 
Senators to each state, regardless of population. Thus Wyoming, with a population of 584,000, has 
the same number of Senators as California, which has more than 39 million people.  
 
Venezuela has a single-chamber legislature, so the disproportionate representation of smaller states 
does not translate into nearly as much disproportionate political power as in the United States. 
However, there is an element of the same disproportionality as in the U.S. For example, the state of 
Amazonas (population 160,548) will send three representatives to the National Assembly while 
Falcón (population 1,052,748), which has more than six and a half times as many inhabitants, will 
send six representatives, and Zulia (population 4,111,832), with over 25 times the population of 
Amazonas, will send 15. 
 
Also since 2010, parties have realigned. In particular, the Fatherland for All (Patria por Todos, or PPT) 
party now affiliates with the PSUV rather than running independently, and the PODEMOS party 
(literally “We can,” an abbreviation of Por la Democracia Social, or For Social Democracy) has moved 
from the MUD coalition to the current pro-government coalition, known as the Simon Bolivar 
Great Patriotic Poll (Gran Polo Patriótico Simón Bolívar or GPPSB). Of course, a party that shifts from 
one coalition to another may not bring with it in 2015 the votes that it had received in 2010. If party 
votes did not change, then such realignment might have brought the government 18–30 additional 
seats. However, polling numbers do not favor the government, and so the opposition has, for the 
first time in 16 years, a real chance of winning a majority of seats in the Assembly. But for reasons 
that are explained below, their expected percentage of Assembly seats is not likely to correspond 
closely to the nationwide polling. 
 
The expansion and reallocation of seats will by itself have very little effect on the composition of the 
National Assembly. Using the actual 2010 votes for each coalition by district, the expansion and 
reallocation, if it had been implemented before the 2010 election, would have given the government 
98 seats — exactly the same number that they actually received in 2010 — and would have resulted 
in two additional seats for the opposition. 
 
If, on the other hand, the party coalitions in 2010 had looked like those of 2015, the 2010 results 
would have been more favorable to the government. If we take the 2010 vote by party in each 
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district as given, but reassign these votes to the coalitions to which these parties now belong, then 
the 2010 vote breaks down as in Table 1, below. 
 
TABLE 1 
Voting Results as They Would Appear Under Current Party Alliances 
(number of votes)  
GPPSB (6,105,591) 
PSUV 5,113,121 PPT 340,566 PODEMOS 298,311 
PCV 162,919 TUPAMARO 152,829 Others 37,845 
MUD (4,075,442) 
UNTC 998,606 MPJ 974,358 AD 924,339 
COPEI 580,458 PRVZL 339,853 LA CAUSA R 103,367 
CUENTAS 
CLARAS 
75,723 Others 78,738   
GANA (412,559) 
MIN-UNIDAD 204,163 Others 208,396   
APR (18,312) 
PODER 
LABORAL 
9,065 Others 9,247   
-OTHER- (697,241) 
ABP 91,408 Others 605,833   
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral (2010) and author's calculations, see Technical Appendix.  
 
Thus, if 2015 voting patterns were consistent with those of 2010, the realigned parties would weigh 
much more heavily in favor of the government. Parties currently in the GPPSB accounted for 54 
percent of the 2010 vote by list. Based on the 2010 vote and with 2015 districting, the support of 
PPT and PODEMOS would have yielded an overwhelming supermajority of 128 seats for the 
government. Even a more unified opposition, with “-OTHER-” parties such as ABP and MR all 
throwing in with the MUD, the number of government seats would fall only to 116 — still beyond a 
two-thirds supermajority. 
 
On the basis of the government’s new coalition, then, it would appear that the government has a 
considerable advantage in the 2015 election — with the potential to win 69 percent of seats in the 
National Assembly with only 54 percent of the vote. However, at a national level the government is 
polling very poorly in advance of the 2015 election and its advantage shrinks considerably as overall 
support for the government falls. 
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Simulating a Range of Election Results 
 
To see how weaker support for the government translates into weaker electoral results we adjust 
down the percentage of votes for the GPPSB until the government no longer holds a majority, and 
then further so that the opposition obtains a three-fifths and then two-thirds supermajority in the 
National Assembly.  
 
As we make these adjustments, there is an additional range of possibilities that should be considered, 
depending on whether or not non-coalition parties in the “-OTHER-” category throw their support 
behind candidates from the MUD coalition, as has occurred in past elections. To take into account 
this additional variable, we will examine a range of potential results that fall between what we can 
call a “unified opposition” scenario, where all parties in the “-OTHER-” category support MUD 
candidates, and a “fractured opposition” scenario, where none of these parties support MUD 
candidates.  
 
If, for example, a “fractured opposition” coalition increases their vote total by 60 percent relative to 
the 2010 elections, then the GPPSB’s resulting 42 percent vote share will net them only 83 seats, or 
just under a majority. If we consider “unified opposition” as described above then the opposition 
could take a majority of the seats with only a 50 percent increase in its votes, despite a 9 percent 
increase in voting for the GPPSB parties. To get a super-majority, with this “unified” opposition —
shown in Table 2 as 55 seats for the government, or just under one-third of the Assembly — the 
opposition would need a 71.8 percent increase in votes, with the government losing 10.8 percent of 
its votes at the same time.  
 
TABLE 2 
Simulated Range of Election Results Leading to Opposition Simple Majority, and 3/5 and 2/3 
Supermajorities 
Opposition Government Votes Opposition Votes Percent Government Seats (of 167) 
Fractured 
-0.8% +60.7% 42% 83 
-12.9 +74.8 37 66 
-22.1 +85.6 33 55 
Unified 
+8.6 +49.6 46 83 
0 +59.7 42 66 
-10.3 +71.8 38 55 
Source: Author's calculations, see Technical Appendix.  
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FIGURE 1 
Overall Share of Votes for Government by Number of Assembly Seats 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Technical Appendix. 
 
It is difficult at this stage to make predictions about the percentage of votes that each coalition 
might get in these elections. While a number of polls show pro-government forces losing decisively, 
the latest polls, as well as recent statements by pollsters such as Luis Vicente León of Datanalysis, 
suggest that support for the government has been increasing over the last few weeks.  
 
A September 2015 poll from the Venezuelan Data Analysis Institute (IVAD) showed the 
government with 17 percent and the MUD with 38 percent of the vote and 28 percent for others.2 
This fractured outcome would likely result in a two-thirds supermajority for the opposition. A MUD 
victory of this size will require a very large shift in voting patterns. The GPPSB parties would have 
to lose some 57 percent of their support while the MUD increases its support by 45 percent. 
 
A mid-November poll, commissioned by the financial consulting firm Ventuari partners, and led by 
polling expert Germán Campos, shows the PSUV with 35 percent of the vote, the “Oposición” 
polling at 30 percent and another 11 percent supporting independents.3 Seventeen percent of those 
                                                 
2  Gutiérrez (2015). 
3  Ventuari Partners (2015). 
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polled indicate that they are still undecided. If these undecided voters are split equally among the 
three aforementioned categories, then the government would expect about 46 percent of the final 
vote and a supermajority of 104–109 seats. On the other hand, if the government picks up only one 
in four of the undecided votes then it could receive 42 percent of the final vote and a simple 
majority of 85–90 seats. Thus, every percentage point for the GPPSB translates into roughly five 
seats in the National Assembly. 
 
Thus, within a certain range of outcomes, disproportional representation of smaller states and a 
unified pro-government coalition will continue to favor pro-government parties in the National 
Assembly.  
 
Given the variance of current polling data, a wide range of outcomes are possible, as well as a range 
of disparities between the division of the popular vote and the government and opposition 
coalitions’ representation in the National Assembly.   
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Technical Appendix 
 
Starting from the reported 2010 election results4 we assembled the vote count for each National 
Assembly race by party. These races included each state’s races by name and by list as well as the 
three regional races for indigenous representation.  
 
We assigned to each party a coalition as in Table 1 (where the “-OTHER-” coalition may be treated 
as separate, as part of a grand coalition with GANA and APR, or as part of the MUD depending on 
the simulation.) We next adjusted the vote count by a fixed factor for each party so that the total 
number of votes cast nationwide in the races by list came to 66 percent of the 19,504,106 eligible5 — 
or 12,872,710 — and that the coalition vote shares match the desired national outcome. 
 
Finally, the coalition winner(s) for each race were decided based on the resulting vote counts. In 
races by list, we determined the number of winners for each coalition via the outlined legal process. 
Briefly, the coalition with the most votes wins both of two seats in a race if it receives two-thirds of 
the two-way vote with the runner-up — otherwise they will split. A race with three seats is more 
complex, but the top coalition will sweep all three seats if it receives three-fourths of the two-way 
vote with the runner-up. 
 
The simulations presented in Table 2 are as follows: the set of “Fractured Opposition” simulations 
treats “-OTHER-” as a distinct coalition; “Unified” treats it as part of a grand coalition with the 
MUD. We adjusted the vote shares for the GPPSB to be as large as possible while still keeping the 
number of seats won by the GPPSB to the target. (That is, while still allowing the rest of the seats to 
represent simple, three-fifths, or two-thirds majorities.) 
 
The simulations corresponding to a specific poll vary by “Fractured” and “Unified” as with Table 2, 
but the vote shares are determined directly from the poll. We always ignore respondents declaring 
intent to abstain; in determining shares, we split the undecideds among the coalitions. Specifically, in 
one set of simulations we split the undecided in proportion to their polled vote, and in another we 
assign the GPPSB one-fourth of the undecideds, with the remaining three-fourths split among the 
rest in proportion to their votes. 
  
                                                 
4  Consejo Nacional Electoral (2010). 
5  Consejo Nacional Electoral (2015). 
